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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
TO~I XORTHERK, 
Plaint iff and R eSJJO 11d c nt) 
YS. 
GEXERAL ~IOTORS CORPORA-
TION, CHEVROLET DIYISION, 
Defendant und Apju:llant. 
Case No. 
7973 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
~TATE~IENT OF FACTS 
A. PRELil\IINARY NTATEMENT 
Plaintiff and respondent, Tom N" oTthern, will be 
n·f<·JTP<l to thToughout this brief as plaintiff; defendant 
and appellant, General :Jfotors Corporation, Chevrolet 
DiYision, will hE' referred to throughout this brief as 
defendant . 
. \ll italics are ours. 
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B. THE FACTS 
The statement of facts contained Ill the brief of 
defendant seems to be fairly accurate. There are anum-
ber of omissions and smne n1atters which will be cor-
rected, but since plaintiff's brief will be primarily a 
discussion of the evidence, a restatement of the facts will 
not be made at this point. 
The Statement of Points contained on pages :21 and 
:22 of the brief of defendant shows that the material por-
tion of the appeal of defendant is concerned only with 
the proposition of whether or not the evidence was suf-
ficient as matter of law to sustain the verdict of the jury 
in plaintiff's favor. There are two statement of point~ 
which do not go directly to this proposition. They con-
cern the matter of whether or not two witnesses were 
qualified to express the opinions which they expressed in 
their testimony. Plaintiff will, therefore, discn8~ in thi~ 
brief in answer to the first four points set forth in 
defendant's Statement of Points, one point which i~ as 
follows: The evidence sufficiently supports the finding 
of the jury that defendant was negligent and that it~ 
negligence caused plaintiff's injuries. 
STATE.MENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS THE 
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT AND THAT ITS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED PLAIN-
TIFF'S INJURIES. 
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POINT II. 
WITNESSES WERTSDERFER AND SYNDER WERE 
QUALIFIED TO EXPRESS OPINIONS CONCERNING OB-
SERVATIONS MADE AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS THE 
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT AND THAT ITS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED PLAIN-
TIFF'S IN JURIES. 
The logical propositions which confront the court 
seem to divide themselves into four distinct and separate 
categories. The first category which plaintiff will dis-
en:-:- concerns the evidence of what happened at Sacra-
mento Pass when plaintiff sustained his injuries. 
(a) The Steering Mechanism Broke While tbe Truck 
was on the Surface of the Highway. 
In discussing the question of what occurred at Sacra-
mento Pa:-;s, the eourt, the jury and all parties must turn 
to the e~'ewitness eYidence of the plaintiff, Tom 
Northern. No one else witnessed the accident which 
caused plaintiff's injuries. 
Plaintiff's evidence is clear, unequivocal and undis-
puted. On his di reet examination he stated as follows 
eoJH·Prning what happened (R. 89, 90) : 
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"Q. vVhen you left the Sacrmnento Pa:'s tell 
us what you did, where you went on the road, and 
what happened~ 
"A. After we put water in the truck I pulled 
out first and went down about a mile or a mile 
and three quarters, son1ewheres in there. 
"Q. \Yhat speed were you making? 
.. A. Started off from stop still. I imagine 
I was travelling around 50 and near 60; went on 
down around a curve, then the first thing I 
knowed I \Yas in the middle of the road from the · 
right side; and I turned my truck back onto the 
right side again, and when I went to turn it again, 
u.:hich the steering wheel had completely turned 
plumb around and the truck went on about its 
business. 
"Q. Did you hit any bumps, or had any jolts 
in the front end of that car before the steering 
wheel cmne loose in your hand and turned~ 
"A. After the steering wheel came loose in 
1ny hand~ 
"Q. Before that time~ 
"A. Before that, no, sir. 
"Q. l\Ir. Northern, had there been any kind 
of ruts or obstructions in the road from Sacra-
mento Pass down to the point where the steering 
wheel came loose in your hand~ 
"A. Only one, and that was on II igll\ra~· X o. 
6, the main road, rough road, graveled state road, 
is all. 
J 
ue! 
lllO 
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"(~. Fr01n the top of ~aeramento Pass down 
to where the steering wheel came loose in your 
hand had there been any rough or obstructions of 
any kind'? 
''~-\.. No, ~ir. 
"Q. \Yill you tell us then what happened 
after the steering wheel came loose in your hand? 
"A. Only thing I could say about that, when 
it came loose it shocked me; I reached for my wife, 
and the next thing I knowed of the steering wheel 
was in 1ny face. 
""Q. vVhere were you when the steering 
wheel was in your face~ 
•• A. God only knows." 
There were several attempts Inade by counsel for 
defendant to confuse, mislead and put into plaintiff's 
mouth words of a contradictory nature, but the quoted 
portion of his evidence stands uncontradicted by any 
evidence. The jury would be required to believe plain-
tiff; find that the steering wheel on his truck came loose 
in his hand before the truck tipped over and before it 
<·ame into collision with any object along the side of the 
high,vay, and while he was operating the truck down a 
slight grade on a usual and ordinary stretch of highway. 
The quoted testimony is substantial evidence of those 
fad~. Even if it were not corroborated by any additional 
immutable or physical proof it would justjfy a finding 
in aeeordance with the testimony. In addition to plain-
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tiff's testimony photographs were introduced in evidence 
"·hich :'hmY beyond dispute that the steering wheel had 
broken and the front wheels were operating free from 
the control of the driver. The photographs showing the 
tire mark-s are Exhibits "C", ":J[" and "N". 
The various measurements concerning the distance 
between the sets of marks shown by the exhibits indicate 
the impossibility for the driver of a vehicle to have 
turned the wheels of the truck with sufficient speed to 
cause the tire marks shown by the exhibits. Even witness 
Harris, defendant's own expert, testified that in his 
opinion the tire marks shown by the exhibits could not 
have been 1nade voluntarily by a person driving the 
truck, and that the tire marks could haYe been made hy 
the wheels after they had broken loose from the steering 
Inechanism (R. 408, 409). The oral testimony of plain-
tiff is thus corroborated and proven beyond possible con-
troversion by the exhibits showing the tire marks on the 
surface of the highway. 
In addition to the recited facts, the occurrence of 
the accident itself indicates that there was some inter-
ference with the driver's control of the truck. There was 
no traffic; the highway was smooth; the highway was 
fairly straight, and nothing on its surface interfen·d with 
the way in which the truck could be controlled. Yt>t, 
suddenly there appeared on the surface of the highway 
tire marks, shown by the exhibits, and the truck swen·ed 
off of the highway and tipperl over in the horrow pit. 
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The happening of this accident is further evidence of the 
truth of plaintiff's testin10ny and of the fact that son1e 
portion of the truck becan1e inoperative causing a loss 
of control by the driver. 
The evidence is substantial, undisputed and corrobo-
rated and plaintiff submits that it forn1s a sound evi-
dentiary basis for a jury finding that the Pitman shaft 
on the steering mechanism broke while plaintiff was 
dri,~ing his truck down the highway in a usual and ordi-
nary 1nanner. 
(b) The Truck Became Uncontrollable Because the 
Pitman Shaft Broke. 
The evidence was clear, undisputed and unequivocal 
concerning the portion of the truck's steering mechanism 
which failed to operate and which resulted in the truck 
being uncontrollable by the driver. 
\Vitnesses \Vertsderfer and Snyder, \Vho were both 
nmchinists of n1any years of experience, examined plain-
tiff::-; truck at the scene of the accident and before it had 
been moved and both stated that the only portion of the 
steering mechanism which they discovered to be broken 
wa:-: the Pitinan shaft. 
Renold 0. Jenson, the purchaser of plaintiff's 
wreeked truck and an auto body repainnan, testified that 
the onl~· portion of the front end of the truck which was 
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damaged \\·as the Pitman shaft and arn1 and that the two 
front wheeb, the drag link and the tension bar were all 
in place; were not dmnaged and were not broken ( R. ~06, 
:207). The effect of this testimony was that the only thing 
in the steering mechanism which ''"as not in an operable 
condition was the Pitman shaft. 
Apparently defendant would, hy its brief, attempt 
to cast some doubt on the proposition that the Pitman 
shaft broke and the loss of control of the truck resulted. 
The speculation thus attempted finds no support what-
ever in the evidence introduced. \Vhen this evidence is 
considered with the evidence recited in Point I, sub-
paragraph (a) it appears that the jury was confronted 
with unequivocal and uncontradicted evidence of two 
facts: that the truck became uncontrollable while being 
operated down the surface of the highway, and that the 
only cause of loss of control was the broken Pitman ~haft. 
The proof of these two facts plaintiff submits would have 
justified the submission of his case to the jury, for a 
jury could have found from the evidence that under nor-
mal operation the Pitman shaft had broken and therefore 
it must not have been reasonably suited or suffieient 
for the purpose for which it was intended, manufactured 
and designed and that defendant was negligent in so 
equipping the Chevrolet truck which it had sold to 
defendant. Defendant went further than the bare mini-
nlum in his proof and offered substantial uncontradieted 
and unequivocal evidence as to the defect in the manu-
facture of the Pitman shaft. 
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(c) The Pitman Shaft Broke Because of a Defect. 
The Pitman shaft that was broken was of the highest 
quality steel. The evidence of the defendant, as well as 
a portion of the evidence of plaintiff, demonstrated 
beyond dispute that it was a high quality chrome steel, 
designed to resist great and enormous pressures, stresses 
and strains. The expert witness, on whom defendant as 
well as plaintiff placed great reliance, that is, Dr. Earl 
R. Parker, testified that in his opinion the shaft was of 
such strength that a driver could not by exertion and 
pressure on the steering wheel break the shaft as it was 
broken (R. 296). Dr. Parker was also of the opinion that 
the force breaking the Pitman shaft moved from the back 
toward the front of the truck, which would not be the 
result had the Pitman shaft been broken by a blow while 
the truck was 1noving forward (R. 294). 
The witnesses for the defendant all agreed with Dr. 
Parker's opinion that the force required to break the 
shaft greatly exceeded the ainount that a driver could 
bring to bear by turning the steering wheel. 
From this evidence plaintiff submits that the jury 
<'ould find that the driver of the truck by manipulating 
the ~teering wheel could not have broken the Pitman 
shaft and that therefore the shaft must have been broken 
at a time prior to the placing of it on the Chevrolet 
truck. 
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This conclusion is further s'ubstantiated by the evi-
dence of Jenson, the auto body man. Jenson testified 
that there were stops which prevent the wheels of the 
truck frmn turning beyond a certain torque and that 
these stops operate independent of the steering meel1an-
isn1 and operate on each individual wheel so that when 
the wheel is back against the stop no amount of force 
applied on it could exert further force into the steering 
mechanis1n (R. 208). 
Plaintiff submits that the evidence of Parker and 
Jenson completely destroys any possible basis for infer-
ence that the Pitman shaft was broken by the operation 
of the truck or by the force of any blow which may have 
been struck on the front end of the truck while it was 
proceeding forward. 
(d) The Pitman Shaft was Broken Before it was 
Assembled on the Truck. 
Plaintiff presented evidence showing that the break 
In the Pitman shaft was in existence before the truck 
wa~ assembled and left the hands of the defendant manu-
facturing company. Defendant's own witnP~~ Griffin 
te~tified that the Pitman shaft was manufactured by a 
diYision of General Motors Corporation and that thP 
a~:-:embling of the Pitman shaft on the ClwvrolPt truek 
was accomplished by the Chevrolet Division of the 
defendant corporation. A part of the assembling of the 
truck included the placing over the point where the Pit-
man f'haft broke a sleeve or bushing, whic·h sleeYP re-
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tained oil between its inside surface and the surface of 
the Pihnan shaft; the oil would prevent rusting on the 
Pitman shaft as long as the bushing was in place (Testi-
mony Jenson, R. :207, 208). 
Plaintiff presented evidence that the broken por-
tions of the Pitman shaft contained on the face of the 
broken surface a rust spot. This condition existed 
immediately following the accident while plaintiff's 
truck was still in position on the edge of the highway. 
The witnesses \V ertsderfer and Synder examined 
the broken Pitman shaft and both were men whose lives 
had been spent handling metals, welding them, exmnin-
ing their surfaces and who were certainly qualified to 
know rust or oxidation on metal when they saw it. The 
testimony of Snyder and Wertsderfer was unequivocal 
that a portion of the surface was oxidized and had a 
slight rust film on it. Wertsderfer pointed out the rust 
film to his wife, whose deposition was also presented 
and considered by the jury. 
rrhe existence of this rust spot on the broken surface 
of the rnetal was one of the most hotly contested issues 
in the case. The testimony of Snyder and Mr. and ~Irs. 
Wertsderfer remained unto the end as a substantial basis 
for a finding that the rust spot existed. 
Even defendant's own witnesses were able, at the 
time of trial, to observe on the surface of the broken 
shaft a portion which was more oxidized than other por-
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tions of the broken shaft. Dr. Parker, whose evidence 
defendant adopts, pointed out to the court and jury the 
superficial oxidation on a portion of the broken part 
(R. 302). Witness Griffin, the expert upon whom the 
defense case primarily rests, in front of the jury and at 
the time of trial, was able to observe the rust on the top 
of the broken portion of the Pitman shaft and this rust 
occurred at the point where Mr. Griffin and the other 
experts testified the break of the shaft commenced. In 
discussing the rust, witness Griffin testified as follows 
(R. 355): 
"Q. Isn't that true- if you look at it maybe 
you can see it a little better than I can, now, but 
above that line there are evidences of rust, which 
do not exist below that line? 
"A. There appears to be rust there that 
doesn't appear below the line." 
He described the rust as superficial oxidation, the 
same language used by Dr. Parker (R. 356). 
One expert, Dr. Fianders, of the Universit~r of Utah, 
could not see the rust on the face of the broken part. 
It appears then that of the five expert witnesses who 
testified about the broken part and examined ib faN' 
four of those witnesses were able to see rust. Two of 
the witnesses saw the rust immediately following the 
accident. The other two saw it sometime after tlw arci-
dent, but nevertheless were able to discern it:-; presence. 
In addition to the four experts, one la~· witllt•:-;:-;, l\1 rs. 
\Y ertsderfer, saw the rust at the time of the accident. 
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Plaintiff sub1nits that there is substantial evidence 
fr01n which the jury could find that the face of the broken 
~haft was rusted iunnediately following the accident; 
that the ru~t could not have accumulated while the shaft 
\Yas in its bushing and under the grease film held in place 
hy the bushing; that therefore the rust must have accum-
ulated in the break prior to the assembling of the bushing 
on the shaft. From these facts it would be required to 
find that the part was broken before assembled and had 
been broken for such a length of tirne as to permit this 
accumulation of rust in the break. A further finding 
would nece~~arily follow that the defendant manufac-
tured and sold the truck purchased by plaintiff without 
adequate precautions and safeguards to insure that the 
steering mechanism was adequate to meet the stresses 
and strains of normal use and that the failure to so 
equip was negligence on the part of defendant. 
No evidence was presented by the defendant as to 
any inspections of the part in question after it was 
umc;hined and assembled and before it was placed on 'the 
truck. Therefore, there is no affirmative proof which 
would overbalance the required findings from the recited 
evidence. 
Plaintiff submits that the evidence presented over-
whPlmingly proves that defendant was negligent and its 
negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries and 
loss suffered by plaintiff. 
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There can be no question concerning the law of the 
State of Ftah since the recent decision of Hooper r. 
General J.llotors CorJJ., ______ Ptah ______ , 260 P. 2d 549. To 
fit the facts of the case at bar into the framework set 
forth in the Hooper opinion I will paraphrase the lan-
guage of that opinion as found on page 551. Plaintiff is 
required to show (1) a defective Pitman shaft at the 
time of the truck assembly; (2) such defect being dis-
coverable by reasonable inspection; (3) injury caused 
hy the failure of the Pitman shaft. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that on each and every 
one of the required elements of liabilit)· the evidence 
overwhelmingly supports the jury's verdict and proves 
hy a great preponderance the required elements set forth 
in the Hooper decision. 
POINT II. 
WITNESSES WERTSDERFER AND SYNDER WERE 
QUALIFIED TO EXPRESS OPINIONS CONCERNING OB-
SERVATIONS MADE AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
Points 5 and 6 of defendant's brief concern claimed 
error in permitting witnesses Gordon Wertsderfer and 
Frank Snyder to testif)- concerning their opinions and 
conclusions. Both witnesses were machinists qualified 
by 40 years of experience in handling-, machining, fash-
ioning and welding metals. These witnesses were both 
at the scene of the accident immediate})· following ib 
oeenrence. I~ach examined the hroken Pitman shaft and 
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each discovered the presence of rust thereon. Certainly 
no one could seriously contend that these men were not 
competent frmn their years of experience to recognize 
rust when they saw it. This court has long recognized 
that practical experts are witnesses whose testimony is 
of great value to the jury. 
In the case of Wright v. Southern Pac. Co., 15 Utah 
-!21, -!9 Pac. 309, 310, a witness for plaintiff, qualified 
as a practical expert, testified concerning certain opera-
tions of a train. His testimony was objected to by the 
defendant and the objection overruled. This ruling of 
the trial court was the subject of the appeal and from 
the opinion of this court we quote: 
" * * * It appears that the witness was shown 
to be competent to testify as an expert. Whether 
a witness is shown to be qualified to testify as 
to matters of opinion is a preliininary question 
for the trial judge to pass upon at the trial, and 
his discretion is conclusive unless rnanifestly 
erroneous as a matter of law. Railway Co. v. 
Novak, 9 C. C. A. 629, 61 Fed. 580. It also appears 
that the subject about which the witness was 
called upon to give his opinion was not a matter 
of such common knowledge that the jury could 
judge as intelligently as one skilled in the use and 
management of an engine. * * *" 
The question of practical expert testimony was sub-
sequently discussed both in the majority and dissenting 
opinions in the case of Graha,m v. Ogden Union Ry. & 
/)('}JOt Co., 79 Utah 1, 6 P. 2d 465, 467. The majority 
opinion states as follows: 
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" * * * The question as to whether the witnes~ 
had shown such knowledge, special skill, or experi-
ence as to entitle him to express an opinion is a 
preliminary one for the court to decide before the 
testimony is received, and ordinarily an appellate 
court will not disturb the trial court's ruling ex-
cept for a clear abuse of discretion. The rule 
applicable is stated as follows: 
"'Whether or not the qualification of a wit-
ness with respect to knowledge or special experi-
ence is sufficiently established is a matter resting 
largely in the discretion of the trial court, whose 
determination is usually final and will not be 
disturbed by an appellate court except in extreme 
cases where it is manifest that the trial court has 
fallen into error or has abused its discretion, and 
that prejudice to the complaining party has re-
sulted, even though the appellate court might have 
decided differently if the question had been pre-
sented to it in the first instance.' 22 C. J. 526. 
"This rule is supported by decisions from thi~ 
court. Garr v. Cranney, 25 Utah, 193, 70 P. 853; 
Olson v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 24 Utah, 460, 68 P. 1-1-S: 
Wright v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Utah, -1-~1, -1-~l 
P. 309." 
A most instructive opinion concerning expert wit-
nesses is Bratt et al v. Western Air Liues, /n('., 155 F. ~<l 
850, 853. There Judge l\f urrah, after re\Tiewing the field, 
stated the rule pertinent here in the following language: 
" * * * There i:-; no prec·ise requirement a~ to 
the mode in which requi~ite skill or experiencP 
shall have been acquired. 'A witne~~ ma~T be com-
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petent to testify as an expert although his knowl-
edge was acquired through the medium of practi-
eal experience rather than scientific study and 
research.' Am. J ur., Evidence, vol. 20, Sec. 784. 
"The witness had no scholastic standing in 
the science of aerodynan1ics, but he was a man of 
practical experience who said he had Inade an 
actual study of the structural stress and strain of 
the parts of an airplane, and that based upon his 
examination of the wreckage at the point of the 
accident and other facts available to him, he had 
an opinion concerning which of the parts of the 
plane structurally failed first in flight, and was 
therefore the proximate cause of the accident. It 
may be that his testimony was of little value when 
judged by the substance of direct testimony, or 
when compared with the testimony of those whose 
opinions are steeped in the lore of scientific re-
search. But, 'the law does not require the best 
possible kind of a witness'. Wigmore on Evidence, 
2d Ed., vol. 1, Sec. 569; Fightmaster v. Mode, 31 
Ohio App. 273, 167 N.E. 407. The testimony of a 
country doctor concerning the sanity of his 
patient is as readily admissable as the testimony 
of the most renowed psychiatrist." 
In the present _case the experts were actually wit-
nesses to the event about which they testify. The extent 
of their qualification would only go to the weight of their 
testimony. Both W ertsderfer and Snyder testified con-
cerning the rust and that in their opinion the presence 
of the rust indicated a flaw in the shaft. Neither 
\Vertsderfer nor Snyder pretended to be experts on the 
composition of the shaft and neither ventured any 
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opinion that metal, of which the shaft "·as con~tructed, 
,,~as not reasonably suited for that purpose. Their testi-
mony wa~ only that the shaft, after being manufactured 
and assembled, contained a fla'" "\Yhich both witnesses 
~aw. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the witne~ses 
\Yertsderfer and Snyder were properly qualified and 
their testimony was competent, material and relevant 
to the issues for the jury to decide. No error was com-
Initted by the ruling of the court in permitting their 
depositions to be read. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff submits that the verdict of the jur)· i~ fair: 
that the eYidence presented supports the findings on 
each and even· element necessary to plaee responsibility 
upon the defendant for plaintiff's injuries and damage. 
That this court ~hould, therefore, affi rlll the judgment 
of the lower court based on the jury's verdid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RA\VLIKGN, \Y..-\LLACg, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
D\YIGHT L. l{INU, 
Collnsel for Plaintiff a}l(l 
RespondP-nf 
530 .Judge Building 
Salt LakE' ('it~·, Ftah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Received copies of the within Brief and 
Respondent this --------··-------··-··-- day of December, A. D. 
1953. 
Cou,nsel for Defendant and .A.ppellai1~t 
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